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August 9, 2002 
On the eve of Operation Desert Storm in January 1991, then-Secretary of State James Baker traveled to 
Geneva to meet with Iraqi Foreign Secretary Tariq Aziz to convey to the Iraqis that any use of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) against coalition forces would be met with an overwhelming response. It was 
widely assumed at the time that this meant that the United States would retaliate with nuclear weapons if 
Iraq used chemical or biological weapons against the coalition. Today, analysts still debate whether Iraq 
was incapable of using its chemical or biological weapons arsenal, never intended to use it, or was 
deterred by the possibility of U.S. nuclear retaliation. This debate will not end soon, as it is unlikely that 
Iraq's leaders will explain their reasons for not using their arsenal. 
Talk of overwhelming retaliation at the Baker-Aziz meeting represented just one chapter in American 
thinking about the role of nuclear weapons in defending U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf and Middle East. 
The most famous U.S. policy toward the region was announced in January 1980, when President Jimmy 
Carter stated that the United States would use "…any means necessary…" to prevent a hostile power, i.e., 
the Soviet Union, from gaining control over the Persian Gulf. While the so-called Carter Doctrine did not 
specifically mention nuclear weapons, it was widely believed at the time that the threat to use nuclear 
weapons was part of the U.S. strategy to deter the Soviets from advancing south from Afghanistan 
towards the oil-rich Persian Gulf. 
 
B-52H bomber with advanced nuclear-tipped cruise missiles 
Today, U.S. officials again face the thorny issue of determining the role that nuclear weapons should play 
in protecting U.S. interests in the region. While the possibility of a military campaign against Iraq 
highlights this issue, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in a matter of fact way identifies the Persian Gulf 
and Middle East as a focus of emerging U.S. nuclear strategy. Released by the Bush administration in 
January 2002, the NPR calls for the military planners to integrate conventional and nuclear forces into a 
single "strategic" deterrent. If necessary, this new strategic triad could be used to disarm and attack 
hostile states and non-state actors that are developing weapons of mass destruction. And, as senior 
officials have noted, preventive or preemptive attacks are the only way to make this type of forceful 
disarmament policy work. The prospect of fighting preventive wars to eliminate clandestine chemical, 
biological and nuclear arsenals is being considered as an overarching strategic option, while the Bush 
administration considers a specific target on the threat horizon, Iraq. 
Preventive War vs. Preemption  
Although the terms often are used interchangeably, "preventive war" and "preemption" 
are different strategic concepts. Preventive war is based on the concept that war is 
inevitable and that it is better to fight now while the costs are low rather than later when 
the costs are high. It is a deliberate decision to begin a war. Preventive war thinking 
seems to dominate U.S. planning about Iraq: it is better to destroy Saddam Hussein's 
regime now then to deal later with a regime armed with nuclear weapons. Preventive war 
thinking, however, can turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy (treating war as inevitable 
helps make it inevitable). It also can lead to unnecessary conflict because few things are 
inevitable: Saddam could die of natural causes next week, producing a significant 
opportunity for the United States and its allies to shape Iraqi politics and policies. 
Preemption is nothing more than a quick draw. Upon detecting evidence that an 
opponent is about to attack, one beats the opponent to the punch and attacks first to 
blunt the impending strike. Preemption or launch-under-attack are strategies that can be 
adopted by states that fear preventive war.  
What About Iraq?  
The prospect of a U.S. attack on Iraq raises questions about the role that nuclear weapons will play in the 
military operation, if any. The need to deter Iraqi use of chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons is 
as important today as was in 1990. Faced with a U.S. invasion, Iraq might choose to use WMD in a 
number of ways: (1) they might be used directly against U.S. forces that are invading Iraq; (2) they might 
be used to attack U.S. forces in the region in response to a U.S. conventional counterforce strike against 
Iraqi WMD targets; (3) they might be used in a pre-emptive strike against U.S. forces or against the 
countries hosting these forces during the buildup to invasion; and, (4) they might be used in an attack 
against Israel, which could prompt a proportionate Israeli response. While the United States would hope 
to deter an Iraqi WMD attack in any of these scenarios, a military campaign to remove Saddam may 
make the deterrent threat of U.S. nuclear weapons mute. Many believe that Saddam views his WMD as a 
"strategic" asset that is vital to his personal survival. With his regime threatened by a U.S. invasion, 
Saddam could conceivably use his toxic arsenal as a weapon of last resort. Unlike Desert Storm, U.S. 
forces would be returning to Iraq not to force a return to the status quo, but to create some fundamental 
changes in Iraqi politics. 
 
Saddam in a recent televised speech in which he vowed that Iraq would repel any invasion and 
severely punish the attackers 
The United States has long maintained a degree of "strategic ambiguity" about using nuclear weapons in 
the case of chemical or biological attack against its forces. A less ambiguous threat of nuclear retaliation 
would undercut the so-called "negative security assurances" given by U.S. officials as part of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime. During an invasion of Iraq, however, U.S. officials might be faced with the 
unpalatable prospect of nuclear escalation in response to Saddam's actions. Or, in the case of an Israeli 
nuclear response, the United States would be presented with nuclear escalation by a third party. The 
prospect of nuclear weapons use in a battlefield setting or in a preemptive strike against hardened 
underground targets is not all that difficult to imagine. Press reports are now surfacing that Iraq has 
developed extensive underground facilities to house its WMD storage and production sites.[1] These are 
sites that would need to be targeted in any military campaign, especially if chemical or biological weapons 
are being used against population centers. Nuclear weapons may be the only way to ensure the prompt 
destruction of an opponent's WMD arsenal and infrastructure.  
What About the Region?  
The Nuclear Posture Review suggests that it is likely that nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological 
weapons will be employed either in or from the Middle East in the future. Nuclear planners no longer 
worry much about a threat from Moscow and instead worry about what is transpiring in Baghdad, 
Damascus, Tripoli and Tehran. The Nuclear Posture review identifies Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya as 
countries that could be involved in immediate, potential or unexpected contingencies requiring the United 
States to use nuclear weapons. One of the three "immediate" contingencies in the NPR in which the 
United States could use nuclear weapons is in fact an Iraqi attack on Israel. 
Changing U.S. nuclear strategy reflected in the NPR and the new strategic framework with Moscow is a 
response to the evolving threat environment produced by the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons and long-range delivery systems during the 1990s. WMD programs in Libya, Syria, Iraq and Iran 
are directly responsible for these countries being made priority "strategic" targets. Precision-guided 
conventional counterforce targeting with the new generation of munitions remains the preferred method of 
countering WMD. But the concern about the underground Libyan complex at Tarhuna voiced in 1996 by 
then-Defense Secretary Perry proved a harbinger of things to come. The NPR identifies a need to now 
target up to 1400 hardened underground facilities around the world that are associated with WMD 
production or storage. Conventional munitions cannot destroy the sites, and the NPR calls for the 
development of a nuclear earth penetrating munitions to hold these targets at risk. Officials are now 
openly commenting on the difficulty of targeting Iraq's underground WMD facilities. If Iraq has moved 
these sites underground, other countries in the region probably have followed suit. 
 
Technicians maintaining a B-61 gravity bomb. This nuclear munition has been identified as one 
that could be modified to hit hardened underground targets.  
Another targeting priority of the NPR is "relocatable targets" i.e., mobile long-range missiles. All of the 
Middle Eastern countries identified in the NPR have active missile, chemical and biological weapons 
programs (courtesy of Russian, Chinese or North Korean benefactors). The situation in Iran is particularly 
ominous, with development of the "indigenous" medium-range Shahab 3 (and a rumored longer-range 
Shahab 4 or 5) missile and efforts to create a fissile material production capability as part of the nuclear 
reactor under construction at Bushehr. While it remains unclear what role, if any, U.S. nuclear weapons 
have in countering these "relocatable" targets, missiles "on the move" are seen as major threat by U.S. 
planners. 
Conclusions 
The reorientation of U.S. strategic deterrence away from Russia and towards proliferators and rogue 
regimes has focused U.S. policy and planning on the Middle East. In the short term, it could force the 
Bush administration to come to terms with the full implications of preventive war strategies. Over the long 
term, it will raise questions about the relevance of nuclear deterrence as a basis for strategic relations in 
the region. The Nuclear Posture Review steers the United Sates into uncharted waters in the region. 
Strategic thinking, not unlike the work that was undertaken during the first decades of the Cold War, is 
needed to flesh out U.S. strategy. 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Middle East Resources. 
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